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Abstract:  Birch’s formulation is persuasive but not nuanced enough to capture at least one 
situation where it is reasonable to invoke the precautionary principle (PP): when we have 
multiple, weak, but convergent, lines of evidence that a species is sentient, but no statistically 
significant evidence of a single credible indicator of sentience within the order as required by 
BAR. I respond to the worry that if we include such cases in our framework for applying the PP, 
we open ourselves to the charge of being “unscientific.”  
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Birch (2017) presents us with a “first-pass” framework for applying the Precautionary Principle 
(PP) to the question of animal sentience. I am broadly sympathetic to Birch’s approach but 
worry that the emphasis on “statistically significant evidence” of at least one credible indicator 
of sentience is too strong. It fails to take into account the type of evidence that we frequently 
have available to us in the case of animal sentience research.   
As noted by Birch, credible and meaningful application of the PP to the question of 
animal sentience involves (among other things) balancing our concern for animal welfare with 
our concern for having scientifically respectable welfare policy. For scientific credibility, Birch 
leans heavily on “normal scientific standards”; for our concerns about risk of harm, he requires 
one credible indicator of sentience in at least one species of the order. Birch’s decision to 
require statistically significant scientific evidence of just one credible indicator of sentience may 
seem quite generous, but  BAR is actually too strong for some situations where one might 
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reasonably want to invoke the PP: cases where we have multiple, weak, but convergent, lines of 
evidence that a species is sentient, but no statistically significant evidence of a single credible 
indicator of sentience within the order. 
Such a situation is not just a hypothetical possibility. Evidence for sentience in animals is 
often weak because of the practical challenges of studying animal cognition, as well as the 
opaque nature of sentience itself. In looking for signs of sentience in other species, our evidence 
is frequently undermined by: 
 
A reliance on small sample sizes: This is commonly the product of small, captive 
populations or the challenges that temperament and life history can pose to the study of 
wild individuals. 
The use of highly enculturated or habituated subjects: This is typically a result of 
reliance on small, frequently studied captive populations, but it can also be due to the 
prior training of subjects that some tests for sentience require.  
Reliance on anecdotal or observational report: Such reports are typically seen as lacking 
scientific rigor. Despite this, we often have far more of this type of evidence than we 
have from controlled laboratory studies (see Browning’s (2017) commentary on this 
article for a more detailed discussion). 
The phylogenetic distance between the target species and our own or other species 
widely accepted to be sentient: This distance weakens the strength of inferences based 
on homology and is most troublesome when we are dealing with non-mammalian 
species. (The detailed recent discussion on sentience and the neurophysiology of fish in 
this journal (Key 2016; Woodruff 2017) offers a good illustration of the challenge posed 
by phylogenetic distance.) 
The challenges posed by producing a species-specific behavioural test for sentience: 
“Gold standard” tests such as the self-delivery of analgesics have physiological, cognitive 
and behavioural requirements that need to be adjusted to suit the particular species in 
question. Such adjustments are not always feasible.  
 
It is always possible that the reason we have limited, poor-quality evidence for the sentience of 
a species is that it is not actually sentient, but not all cases of limited or poor-quality evidence 
are the same. There is a big difference between having (1) many lines of weak, but convergent, 
positive evidence for sentience, and having (2) a little weak positive evidence along with many 
lines of negative evidence, or (3) many lines of weak evidence in which there is no particular 
trend for or against sentience.  In (1) (but clearly not (2) and (3)), although we lack statistically 
significant evidence, we do have some empirical justification for invoking something like the PP 
on the grounds of inference to the best explanation (IBE). Indeed, this looks like exactly the 
situation in which advocates of the PP would want to invoke the principle—to allow action 
where we have good justification for thinking a species may be sentient, but not enough for 
statistical significance on even one credible indicator of sentience.  
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This proposed change to  BAR does not necessarily put the scientific credibility of the PP 
at risk. To invoke IBE across multiple lines of weak, but convergent, evidence is not to invite 
insensitivity to evidence: it is to take seriously precisely the kind precaution against inaction in 
the face of evidence for sentience that the PP was originally formulated to achieve. Moreover 
(as Birch notes), far from being “unscientific,” IBE is a common form of reasoning in science. 
Birch himself uses IBE in his formulation of the  PP.  All I add is the suggestion to extend the PP 
across different credible indicators to include not only statistically significant evidence of 
sentience, but also multiple, weak and convergent evidence. This is in line with the original 
motivations behind the PP.  
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On November 17-18, 2017, the NYU Center for Mind, Brain and 
Consciousness, the NYU Center for Bioethics, and NYU Animal Studies will 
host a conference on Animal Consciousness. 
 
This conference will bring together philosophers and scientists to discuss 
questions such as: Are invertebrates conscious? Do fish feel pain? Are non-
human mammals self-conscious? How did consciousness evolve? How does 
research on animal consciousness affect the ethical treatment of animals? What 
is the impact of issues about animal consciousness on theories of consciousness 




Speakers and panelists include: 
  
Colin Allen (University of Pittsburgh, Department of History & Philosophy of 
Science), Andrew Barron (Macquarie, Cognitive Neuroethology),  
Victoria Braithwaite (Penn State, Biology), Peter Carruthers (Maryland, 
Philosophy), Marian Dawkins (Oxford, Zoology), Dan Dennett (Tufts, 
Philosophy), David Edelman (San Diego, Neuroscience),  
Todd Feinberg (Mt. Sinai, Neurology), Peter Godfey-Smith (Sydney, 
Philosophy), Lori Gruen (Wesleyan, Philosophy), Brian Hare (Duke, Evolutionary 
Anthropology), Stevan Harnad (Montreal, Cognitive Science), Eva Jablonka (Tel 
Aviv, Cohn Institute), Björn Merker (Neuroscience), Diana Reiss (Hunter, 
Psychology), Peter Singer (Princeton, Philosophy), Michael Tye (Texas, Philosophy) 
 
 
Organizers: Ned Block, David Chalmers, Dale Jamieson, S. Matthew Liao. 
 
The conference will run from 9am on Friday November 17 to 6pm on Saturday November 18 at the NYU Cantor Film Center (36 E 
8th St).  
 
Friday sessions will include “Invertebrates and the evolution of consciousness”, “Do fish feel pain?”, and “Animal consciousness 
and ethics”.  
 
Saturday sessions will include “Animal self-consciousness”, “Animal consciousness and theories of consciousness”, and a panel 
discussion.  
 
A detailed schedule will be circulated closer to the conference date. 
 
Registration is free but required.  
 
Register here.  
 
See also the conference website. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
